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Warren and Tricia Osborn, Michael F. Sullivan) 1 David and Cynthia Mirsky, 
Norman Pro van, Jeffrey and Nancy Trumper, Gary and Catherine Crittenden, Dave 
Checketts and Mount Clyde Enterprises LC (collectiyely the "Property Owners") 
each of whom are property owners of a legally indiVisible 160 acre or 184 acre 
platted lot1 (each shall be referred to herein as a "paijcel" or "lot") at Wolf Creek 
Ranch, located in Wasatch County, Utah, hereby 
Appellants and Brief of Cross-Appellees (the Property Owners) in answer to the 
Briefs of Respondents Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission") and 
Wasatch County ("Wasatch County") and in response 
Appellant Wasatch County's Brief, as they relate tp Wasatch County's Cross 
submit this Reply Brief of 
to the issues raised in Cross-
Appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT RELATED TO 
PROPERTY OWNERS APPEAL 
As proven herein, the Tax Commission's Brief 
mischaracterize the sole legal issue presented by the 
the Tax Commission's April 1, 2008 decision (the "Tax Commission Decision") as 
an appeal of a factual issue. In reality, the Property Owners' appeal challenges 
only the legal foundation upon which the Tax Commission Decision rests. 
and Wasatch County's Brief 
Property Owners' appeal of 
For purposes of clarity when the difference in the 
184 acres, is immaterial, each shall be referred to as a 
sjize of a parcel, 160 acres or 
^60 acre parcel or lot. 
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Specifically, the Tax Commission's Brief and Wasatch County's Brief 
mischaracterize the ultimate issue of this case by: 
(1) misrepresenting the issue before this Court as an issue of fact (choice 
and application of property valuation methodology) rather than an issue of law (the 
legal boundaries or constraints of a permissible valuation methodology). 
Specifically, the ultimate and controlling issue in this case is whether the Tax 
Commission can disregard, and effectively rewrite Utah's "fair market value" 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12), which requires that assessment of real 
property in Utah be made consistent with applicable zoning laws, which in this 
instance would include one acre of a legally indivisible 160 acre platted lot at Wolf 
Creek Ranch withdrawn from "Farmland Assessment"; and 
(2) ignoring applicable zoning laws and manipulating indisputable 
material facts to achieve an excessive assessed value of one acre, within the legally 
indivisible 160 acre platted lot at Wolf Creek Ranch. Wasatch County's 
assessment and the Tax Commission Decision violated zoning laws by allocating a 
grossly disproportionate value of the entire 160 indivisible acre lot to the one acre 
no longer eligible for "Farmland Assessment," as if such one acre were a "stand-
alone" divisible lot, legally separable from the other 159 acres, and as if each acre 
in the lot, except the one acre upon which a home was built, has negligible value. 
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While the Tax Commission's Brief refers to "fair market value," the 
Commission's Brief, significantly, never cites nor quotes the mandatory "fair 
market value" statute. The Tax Commission's Brief does not even list the "fair 
market value" statute among its "Determinative Statutes." Tax Commission Brief, 
p. 2. Although the Tax Commission does not deem the "fair market value" statute 
as relevant to the valuation and assessment of the subject property, a fair and 
reasonable application of the "fair market value" statute requires that each and 
every acre within a legally indivisible 160 acre platteq lot be assessed at the same 
value. 
Similarly, Wasatch County's Brief fails to address the sole issue presented 
by the Property Owners' appeal of the Tax Commission Decision ("Appeal"): 
whether the Tax Commission Decision violates Utah Code §59-2-102(12) by 
allocating 65% of the value of each parcel to the 10 acre building envelope based 
solely on a hypothetical sale of a 10 acre portion of me parcel when it is legally 
impossible for such sale to ever occur. It is legally impossible for a sale to occur 
because applicable zoning restrictions prohibit any division or separation of any 
portion of a Property Owner's parcel. Wasatch County elects instead to argue that 
the Tax Commission's Decision to ignore applicable zoning laws in violation Utah 
Code §59-2-102(12), presents a factual issue, therefore 
Owners' Appeals be dismissed for failing to marshal the evidence. 
mandating that the Property 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT RELATED TO 
WASATCH COUNTY'S CROSS-APPEAL 
Wasatch County's Cross-Appeal misunderstands the standard of review 
applicable to this Court's review of questions of fact. Wasatch County argues that 
there was substantial evidence in support of Wasatch County's argument, which 
the Tax Commission rejected, that the value of the building rights on each parcel 
migrates to the one-acre home site, rather than the ten-acre allowable building 
envelope. Wasatch County fails to address, much less demonstrate, that the Tax 
Commission Decision, which held that 65% of the value of the parcel attached to 
the ten-acre building envelope, was not supported by substantial evidence. Rather, 
Wasatch County urges this Court to reweigh the evidence presented during the Tax 
Commission hearing. 
In the event this Court rules in favor of the Property Owners, which it must 
and should by applying Utah Code Ann. §59-2-102(12) (the "fair market value" 
statute) in accordance with its plain language, the factual issue (whether the Tax 
Commission Decision is supported by substantial evidence) presented in Wasatch 
County's cross-appeal becomes moot. The issue is mooted because the legal 
requirement for all assessments is that "fair market value" shall be determined 
using the current zoning laws, which zoning laws in this case prevent subdivision 
of the parcels. Necessarily, therefore, the only legally permissible "methodology" 
for valuation of a Property Owner's parcel is to value the entire parcel at its highest 
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and best use and multiply such value by 1/160 (or 1/184) to determine the fair 
market value of the one-acre home site. Then, for greenbelt purposes, the entire 
parcel must be valued according to its agricultural use and the aggregate must then 
be multiplied by 159/160 (or 183/184 as the case may be). Stated simply, valuing 
a Property Owner's parcel in any other manner violates the Utah Code and is a 
clear legal error. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TAX COMMISSION'S BRIEF tyHSREPRESENTS THE 
PRIMARY ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT AS AN ISSUE OF FACT, 
WHEN THE PRIMARY ISSUE IS AN ISSUE OF LAW, 
A* Statement of the Case 
The Tax Commission's "Statement of the Case/Statement of Facts" 
essentially repeats and is not inconsistent with the Property Owners' "Factual 
Background and Chronology," as stated in the Property Owners' opening brief. In 
summary, the Property Owners' appeals to the Tax Commission arose from 
Wasatch County's "rollback tax" assessments for tax year 2006, which 
assessments Wasatch County issued to each Property Owner of a legally 
indivisible 160 acre platted lot at Wolf Creek Ranch in Wasatch County. The 
Property Owners' home and other building improvement assessments are not at 
issue. The sole issue is the valuation assessment of the land underneath the home. 
I 
The "rollback" tax assessments were and are, authorized under the Utah 
Farmland Assessment Act, specifically Utah Cod^ Ann. § 59-2-506, which 
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imposes a tax on the "fair market value" of land withdrawn from "greenbelt," 
retroactive for five years. This "rollback tax" was imposed when a Property 
Owner withdrew an acre (or less) of the Property Owner's lot at Wolf Creek Ranch 
from "greenbelt" for construction of certain improvements, typically a home. 
The Wolf Creek Ranch subdivision is an approved, platted subdivision in 
Wasatch County. In each instance, the one (or less) acre of land disturbed for 
improvement, and hence withdrawn from "Farmland Assessment" or "greenbelt," 
is part of a much larger, indivisible 160 acre (or more) platted lot which a Property 
Owner owns. Wasatch County assessed "rollback taxes" and property taxes on the 
one (or less) acre improvement site as if the home-site were independent from and 
could be assessed ignoring the legal and physical indivisibility of the 160 (or more) 
acre lot within which the one (or less) acre is a part, and as if each of the other 159 
acres has only nominal value. 
B. An Issue of Law, Not of Fact 
The Tax Commission and Wasatch County mischaracterize the sole issue 
raised in the Property Owners' Appeals as one of fact (valuation methodology) 
rather than law (whether the "fair market value" statute permits disregard of zoning 
laws in assessing property). Proper characterization of the issue raised in the 
Property Owners' Appeals as one of law or fact is critical This is because "in 
reviewing the Commission's formal adjudicative proceedings, [the appellate 
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courts] grant no deference to the Commission's conclusion of law, reviewing them 
for correctness. Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b)(x006); see also Kennecott 
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). [The Utah 
appellate courts] do, however, grant deference to the Commission's written 
findings of fact, applying the 'substantial evidence standard' on review.' Utah 
Code Ann. § 69-l-610(l)(a)." Dennis Mandell v. Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission, 186 P.3d 335, 339 (Utah 2008). 
Both the Tax Commission and Wasatch County attempt to twist the issue 
presented by the Property Owners' Appeals into ^n appeal of a valuation 
methodology, an inherently factual issue, essentially claiming that valuation is an 
art, not a science subject to rules. In so doing, both the Tax Commission and 
Wasatch County fail to acknowledge the legal boundaries and constraints the Utah 
Constitution and the Utah Code impose on valuation methodologies and standards. 
The Tax Commission and Wasatch County ignore the legal mandate that property 
tax assessments are required to meet the standards of uniformity and equality set 
forth in the Utah Constitution, and are required to satisfy the standard of "fair 
market value, as set forth in the Utah Code. See Utah Const, Art. XIII, §2; Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 59-2-102(12) and 59-2-103(1). The Tax Commission and Wasatch 
County nonsensically assert that the Tax Commission's adopted valuation 
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methodology, which violates the Utah Constitution and governing statutes, is an 
issue of fact, and is therefore entitled to deference. 
To the contrary, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that decisions 
of administrative agencies, such as the Tax Commission, must accord with 
governing statutes and the Utah Constitution. Hence, assessment of property in 
conformity with constitutional and statutory law is not optional, as Wasatch 
County and the Tax Commission argue. See, e.g., Crossroads Plaza Ass 'n. v. 
Pratt, 912 P.2d 961, 965 (Utah 1996)("It is a longstanding principle of 
administrative law that an agency's rules [and/or valuation methodology] must be 
consistent with its governing statutes. . . Further, an administrative rule out of 
harmony or in conflict with the express provisions of a statute would in effect 
amend the statute"). In this case, the Tax Commission Decision ignores and 
violates, rather than accords with, governing law, and therefore it is particularly 
specious to argue that such is entitled to deference. 
The valuation methodology adopted in the Tax Commission Decision 
assumes applicable zoning ordinances on the subject property do not exist. 
Disregard of zoning ordinances applicable to the property being valued is not 
simply an optional valuation methodology entitled to deference. Exactly the 
opposite is true. The statutory definition of "fair market value" expressly provides 
that the applicable zoning restrictions and constraints must be applied in 
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determining value. In the present case, the zoning laws and ordinances applicable 
to Property Owners' Wolf Creek Ranch lots do not permit the sale, conveyance or 
separation of a one-acre home site from the other 159 acres that constitute the 
legally platted 160 acre lot. Accordingly, there is no legally permissible way to 
determine the "fair market value" of the 160 acre lot other than on an equal per 
acre (or pro rata) basis. Each and every acre in the single and legally indivisible lot 
must have a "fair market value" equal to each and every other acre as a matter of 
law. No higher assessed value can be concentrated on I any single acre, as the Tax 
Commission has unlawfully done. See Petitioner Brief, p. 23. 
C. The Tax Commission's Illegal Valuation Methodology 
The Utah Supreme Court has further held that "all property shall be valued, 
for the purposes of assessment, as near as is reasonably practicable, at its full cash 
value; in other words, that the valuation for assessment and taxation shall be, as 
near as reasonably practicable, equal to the cash price for which the property 
valued would sell in the open market, for this is doubtless the correct test of the 
value of property." Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County Bd of 
Equalization, 110 P.3d 691, 698 (Utah 2005). In other words, property must be 
assessed at "fair market value." 
As noted in the Summary of Argument section of this brief, both the Tax 
Commission's Brief and Wasatch County's Brief ignore the "fair market value" 
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statute by assuming fair market value is solely a factual determination entitled to 
deference. Yet by its plain language, the "fair market value" statute establishes the 
mandatory legal framework in which all real property in Utah must be valued and 
assessed. The "fair market value" statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12), defines 
"fair market value" as: 
the amount at which property would change hands 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither 
being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both 
having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. For 
purposes of taxation, "fair market value" shall be 
determined using the current zoning laws applicable 
to the property in question, except in cases where there 
is a reasonable probability of a change in the zoning laws 
affecting that property in the tax year in question and the 
change would have an appreciable influence upon the 
value. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Note that the "fair market value" statute is based upon an exchange value of 
the property at issue. In this case, it is indisputable that the "current zoning laws 
applicable to the property in question," specifically that the minimum lot size is 
160 acres categorically preclude the sale of one acre subdivisions of the lot. Any 
sale or exchange (hypothetical or actual) can only be of the entire 160 acre platted 
lot. Hence, in valuing a single acre of the indivisible 160 acre platted lot, these 
mandatory zoning laws must be recognized and cannot be violated in determining 
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the "fair market value" of one indivisible part of the 160 acres in a Wolf Creek 
Ranch lot. 
The Tax Commission states that "the one-acre home site within the parcel 
must be separately valued under the FAA [Farmland Assessment Act], because the 
one-acre home site is no longer eligible for Farmland Assessment." Tax 
Commission Brief, p. 12. While such statement is true as a general proposition, it 
is misleading in this case. The fair market value of the one-acre home site must be 
valued in accordance with its highest and best use at "fair market value," which 
can be no different than the highest and best use of the entire indivisible parcel of 
which the one acre is a 1/160th part. The undisturbed 159 acres of the indivisible 
parcel likewise have the same highest and best use. The fact that the 159 acres are 
subject to the Farmland Assessment Act does not change their highest and best use 
and associated fair market value. Application of the Farmland Assessment Act 
simply means that 159 acres of the indivisible lot will be taxed in accordance with 
its agricultural use value, not its highest and best use value.. The significance of 
that indisputable legal premise is that while a separate value must be identified for 
the one-acre home site as compared to the remaining acreage, this does not mean 
that the one acre portion of the parcel (taxed in accordance with its highest and best 
use) and the remaining 159 acre portion of the parcel (taxed in accordance with its 
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agricultural use) can somehow be valued independently by assuming that they are 
legally divisible, as the Tax Commission and Wasatch County argue. 
Both the Tax Commission and Wasatch County misinterpret the term 
"separately valued" as meaning that the one-acre home site must be valued 
independently from the indivisible whole, by assuming and comparing the one-acre 
home site to incomparable one-acre home sites that are legally separate and 
divisible. Such interpretation violates the Utah Constitution, the Utah Code and 
the purpose of the Farmland Assessment Act. This interpretation ignores 
applicable zoning law and values certain rights that the Property Owners' do not 
possess—the right to subdivide and further develop the parcel. Because no 
Property Owners' parcel can be legally subdivided or further developed, it is clear 
that the one-acre home site does not have a value independent of the remaining 
acreage and visa versa. The "hypothetical sale between a willing buyer and a 
willing seller" upon which the Tax Commission Decision is supposedly based is 
legally impossible and surely is beyond an appropriate valuation methodology 
within which the Tax Commission may exercise its discretion. 
Both the Tax Commission and Wasatch County misconstrue Utah Code 
Ann. §59-2-507(2), which provides: 
All structures which are located on land in agricultural 
use, the farmhouse and the land on which the farmhouse 
is located, and land used in connection with the 
farmhouse, shall be valued, assessed, and taxed using 
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the same standards, methods, and procedures that 
apply to other taxable structures and other land in the 
county. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-507(2) (emphasis added). 
Both the Tax Commission and Wasatch County interpret this statute to mean 
that land withdrawn from agricultural use can be valued as if such land was 
separate and distinct from the parcel of which it forms a part. Noticeably absent 
from the plain language of the above quoted statute is any language providing 
authority to treat withdrawn land as an independent stand-alone parcel in valuing 
such withdrawn land. Indeed, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §59-2-507(2) 
unequivocally mandates that withdrawn land must be valued, assessed and taxed 
using the same standards, methods and procedures that apply to other land in the 
county. Therefore, unless Wasatch County's usual assessment and valuation 
method is to ignore and violate zoning laws in assessing property, the one-acre 
home site cannot be treated as a stand-alone parcel for purposes of valuation and 
assessment. 
Further, Wasatch County argues that the Farmland Assessment Act and the 
"fair market value" statute are inconsistent. While, as demonstrated above, such 
argument is demonstrably false, if there is any ambiguity or inconsistency between 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-102(12) (requiring that fair market value be determined in 
accordance with existing zoning laws) and Utah Code Ann. 59-2-507(2) (requiring 
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that land excluded from assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act is valued 
using the same standards, methods, and procedures that apply to other taxable 
structures), then such ambiguity or inconsistency must be construed in favor of the 
taxpayer, in this case the Property Owners. 
This is because the Farmland Assessment Act is not a tax exemption statute, 
but, as the Utah Supreme Court has held, is a tax imposition statute. Wasatch Bd 
Equalization v. State Tax Comm., 944 P.2d 370, 373 (Utah 1997). While it is true 
that the Farmland Assessment Act does provide for preferential tax treatment, it 
clearly does not exempt the Property Owners from property taxes. Indeed, the 
Farmland Assessment Act, including the provisions related to rollback taxes, 
impose a property tax, which is calculated in accordance with the land's 
agricultural use value. 
In Utah, "our practice is to construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of the 
taxpayer, leaving it to the legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if 
such intent exists." Salt Lake County v. State Tax Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1131, 1132 
(Utah 1989). While it is true that the Farmland Assessment Act does provide 
preferential tax treatment for land that qualifies for agricultural use, the Act clearly 
cannot and does not undermine the "fair market value55 statutory and constitutional 
standard for assessing property in Utah. 
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Moreover, the Tax Commission's and Wasatch County's interpretation of 
the term "separately valued" distorts both the law and the facts. Initially, the Tax 
Commission claims that "the Owners do not ask that their parcels be valued at fair 
I 
market value." Tax Commission Brief, p. 12. That is a misrepresentation of the 
Property Owners' position, which is precisely the opposite. It is the Tax 
Commission and Wasatch County, and not the Property Owners, which seek to 
have the building envelope or a portion thereof valued as a separate parcel that 
does not and cannot exist, in violation of the "fair market value" statutory mandate. 
To justify its disregard of applicable zoning laws, which preclude the 
divisibility of an indivisible 160 acre platted lot, the Tax Commission initially 
argues that when land, in this instance one acre of a legally indivisible 160 acre lot, 
is withdrawn from application of the Farmland Assessment Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-503, the withdrawn land is subject to a "rollback tax." Id. at 13. The 
Property Owners do not dispute that initial premise. Both the Tax Commission 
and Wasatch County attempt to confuse the issue because "rollback taxes" are not 
relevant to this appeal. 
From that undisputed point, the Tax Commission claims that "[S]ince the 
home site is only a small portion of the parcel, its value must be separately 
identified." Id. That is a misleading statement The Tax Commission misstates the 
issues to be decided by falsely assuming the one acre lot in question is a separate 
4831-3554-8419 7 15 
lot, and not an indivisible part of a legally indivisible lot. Quoting Board of 
Equalization Salt Lake County v. Benchmark, 864 P.2d 882 (Utah 1993), the Tax 
Commission notes that "Section 59-1-103(1) contemplates nothing more than a 
hypothetical sale to a hypothetical buyer." Id. at 14. Assuming a hypothetical 
buyer, however, does not and cannot mean that the Tax Commission is at liberty to 
assume away the mandatory zoning ordinances applicable to all Wolf Creek Ranch 
lots. Moreover the "hypothetical sale" must be one that can legally occur in the 
real world. There is absolutely no language or even an implication in the Farmland 
Assessment Act to the contrary. 
For example, if a parcel of property is zoned for residential use only, but 
such property's highest and best use is a commercial use, it is indisputable that a 
county cannot ignore such zoning restriction and value such property in accordance 
with its commercial use. This is precisely what the Tax Commission has done in 
this case. The Property Owners' do not have the right to subdivide their property 
because it is zoned P-160, yet the Tax Commission has valued the right to 
subdivide the 160 acre platted lot and in doing so is impermissibly valuing rights 
that the Property Owners do not possess, and, in effect, devaluing the other 
inseparable acres, which the Property Owners testified was the primary motivation 
for their purchase of the 160 acre lot. 
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Neither of the "Determinative Statutes" the Tax Commission lists in its 
Brief, specifically Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-507(1) and (2), which itemize the 
identifiable characteristics of agricultural use, authorize a disregard of the "fair 
market value55 statute and its requirement that applicable zoning ordinances must 
be applied in valuing land withdrawn from agricultural assessment. Neither is 
there any language in the "rollback tax55 statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-506, 
which is not applicable to this appeal, that authorizes a disregard of the "fair 
market value55 statute. The "rollback tax55 statute simply provides that any change 
in land use or other withdrawal of land from agricultural use valuation subjects the 
land to the "rollback tax.55 
A hypothetical sale, which the Utah Supreme Court has recognized as 
standard appraisal methodology, does not permit hypothetical disregard of 
mandatory zoning laws. Nor can a legitimate hypothetical sale be a sale that is 
legally impossible or impermissible. That is why the Tax Commission's Decision 
is fundamentally flawed. As Law Professor David Thomas, whose expertise is 
property law, testified, "Here [in this case] the essential relevant [and undisputed] 
fact is that the only transaction possible between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller is for the entire 160-acre tract. This land cannot be separated from or treated 
differently from the rest of the 160-acres.55 Thomas Report, R. at 000876. 
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II. THE TAX COMMISSION'S BRIEF AND WASATCH COUNTY'S 
BRIEF FURTHER DISTORT THE FACTS BY CLAIMING THERE 
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO VALUE ONE ACRE AS AN 
INDIVISIBLE PART OF THE WHOLE. 
The Tax Commission begins the second major argument of its brief by 
stressing that the choice of valuation method, and "the resulting determination of 
market value is a question of fact" to which this Court must give deference. Tax 
Commission Brief, p. 17, quoting Beaver County v WilTel, Inc., 995 P.2d 662 
(Utah 2000). Similarly, Wasatch County attempts to characterize the allocation of 
value to the one-acre home site and the remaining acreage as merely a choice of 
valuation method. While it is true that the choice of a valuation methodology 
involves a factual determination, that determination, as conclusively proven in the 
Property Owners' Argument I above, must be within the legal constraints of the 
"fair market value" statute, which the Tax Commission has ignored. 
Again, Wasatch County misstates the issue presented by the Property 
Owners' Appeals by stating that, "the Petitioners' arguments for a pro rata 
allocation are factually barred." Wasatch County Brief, p. 19. The Property 
Owners' are NOT arguing that the Tax Commission should have selected a 
different valuation methodology than the one chosen. Rather the Property Owners' 
assert that the Tax Commission committed legal error by assuming for purposes of 
valuing the one-acre home site that the parcels are legally separate and divisible, 
which is in direct contravention of existing zoning laws. 
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Further, because the parcels are legally indivisible and under Utah law this 
fact cannot be merely hypothesized away, the only legally permissible manner by 
which to determine the value of the one-acre home site and the remaining acreage 
is by valuing the entire 160 acre parcel in accordance with its highest and best use 
and multiply such value by 1/160 (or 1/184 as the case may be) to determine the 
fair market value of the one-acre home site. Then, for "greenbelt" purposes, the 
entire parcel must be valued according to its agricultural use and such value must 
then be multiplied by 159/160 (or 183/184 as the case may be). Stated simply, 
valuing the Property Owners' parcels in any other manner violates the Utah Code 
and represents a clear legal error. 
The Tax Commission then claims it "allocated the fair market value of the 
parcel based upon the known characteristics of the one-acre home site." Id. at 18. 
That is a demonstrably false claim. The Tax Commission does recite some 
(although largely irrelevant) facts, such as the "evidence showed that properties 
[are] subject to a conservation easement or properties with no building rights and 
limited to recreational or agricultural use had lower value than properties with 
building rights." Id. However, the Tax Commission never mentions the 
indisputable fact that the building rights in the 160 acre lot do not exist absent the 
legally inseparable acreage of the other 150 acres upon which nothing can lawfully 
be built. Nor can the so-called 10 acre building envelope be separated or sold 
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independently from the non-buildable acres. Rather the Tax Commission, 
assuming a legal and factual fiction, concentrates the undisputed value of the 160 
acre platted lot on the 10-acre building envelope, including the one-acre building 
site because the Tax Commission, again in disregard of the evidence, apparently 
concludes that building envelopes are always more valuable than non-building 
envelopes. The only disagreement between the Tax Commission and Wasatch 
County on this point is that the Tax Commission allocated 65% of a $1.3 to $1.8 
million lot value to the 10 acre building envelope, whereas Wasatch County 
allocated solely to the one (or less) acre upon which the home was built. 
Economist Dr. Robert Crawford testified "for comparability [valuation 
methodology purposes] using a 1 acre whole/piece as a comparable for a 1 acre 
moment/part to estimate its 'market value' is invalid, since by design, the subject 
part is purposely, and distinctly not comparable to any similarly sized saleable 
whole [ the indivisible 160 lot]." Crawford Expert Witness Report, p. 3, Record 
000862. Dr. Crawford's testimony was uncontradicted. Stated simply, the 150 
acre portion of the 160 acre parcel does not and cannot have a value independent of 
the 10 acre portion of the 160 acre parcel and visa versa. 
In essence, both the Tax Commission and Wasatch County urge this Court to 
adopt a valuation methodology that is inconsistent with Utah law and the Utah 
Constitution. If some properties within the state are required to be valued in 
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accordance with existing zoning laws, while others can be valued by hypothesizing 
such zoning laws away and incorporating into such valuations the value of 
intangible rights which the property owner does not possess, then clearly property 
within the state will not be valued at a uniform and equal rate. Such a scenario 
clearly violates the statutory definition of "fair market value" and Article XIII, 
Section 2 of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, the only legally permissible manner 
of valuing different portions of the Property Owners' parcels is as set forth above. 
I 
IH. WASATCH COUNTY, RATHER THAN DEMONSTRATING THAT 
THE TAX COMMISSION DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, INAPPROPRIATELY URGES THIS 
COURT TO REWEIGH THE EVIDENCE IN ITS FAVOR 
Wasatch County's Cross-Appeal fails to marshal the evidence in support of 
I 
the Tax Commission Decision. Instead Wasatch County attempts to persuade this 
Court there was substantial evidence in support of the County's argument, which 
the Tax Commission rejected, that the value of the building and development rights 
on each parcel migrates to the one-acre home site, rather than the ten-acre building 
envelope. 
The Property Owners stress that in the event this Court rules in the Property 
I 
Owners' favor with respect to their Appeals, which must occur if the Court applies 
| 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-102(12) in accordance with its plain language, the County's 
paramount issue - whether the Tax Commission Decision is supported by 
substantial evidence - becomes moot. The arguments that the Property Owners 
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here present under Argument HI in this brief in opposition to Wasatch County's 
cross-appeal are made in the alternative. 
Under the substantial evidence standard of review, this Court will uphold the 
Tax Commission's factual determinations so long as there is sufficient evidence to 
support its findings. See County Bd of Equalization v. Stichting Mayflower 
Recreational Fonds, 2000 UT 57, \ 11, 6 P.3d 559. This Court, when reviewing 
agency decisions, does not reweigh the evidence, nor substitute its conclusions for 
that of the agency. See Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 
1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). Further, this Court will not disturb an agency's findings 
simply because another conclusion can be drawn from the evidence. See Whitear 
v. Labor Comm% 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct.App.1998). 
As applied to Wasatch County's cross-appeal, Wasatch County fails to 
establish that the Tax Commission Decision was not supported by substantial 
evidence. As demonstrated below, the Tax Commission Decision, albeit a decision 
violative of Utah law, was in conformity with the evidence. On the other hand, 
Wasatch County urges this Court to substitute its own conclusions from such 
evidence. Clearly, reweighing evidence and substituting conclusions is not the 
task before this Court. Therefore, Wasatch County's cross-appeal must be denied. 
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IV. WASATCH COUNTY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE, 
WHICH IS SUBSTANTIAL, SUPPORTING THE TAX 
COMMISSION DECISION. 
Wasatch County failed to satisfy its marshalling duty by failing to present 
substantial evidence, which supports the Tax Commission Decision. To satisfy the 
marshalling duty: 
Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's 
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order 
to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists."1 
Utah R. App. P. 24 (Advisory Committee Note) (citations omitted). 
The Tax Commission Decision, which held that 65% of the value of the 
parcel attached to the ten-acre building envelope, is supported by the following 
evidence, which Wasatch County omits from its Brief: 
1. Each of the Property Owners' parcels contained a ten-acre building 
envelope. (R. at 1426-1432). 
2. Wasatch County's witness, Blaine Hales, testified that he valued the 
building rights in determining the value of the one-acre home site. Id. 
3. The building rights, that allegedly justified attaching a higher value to 
the ten-acre portion of the parcel, attached not just to the one-acre home site, but 
rather to the ten acre building envelope. (Id.; R. 00137l|) 
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The factual determination that forms the basis of Wasatch County's cross-
appeal is that it was improper for the Tax Commission to allocate 65% of the value 
of the entire parcel to the ten-acre building envelope on each parcel, rather than 
solely to the one-acre home site. The Tax Commission Decision states: 
From review of Mr. Hales' appraisal, his testimony at the 
hearing regarding the 10-acre building site and that of the 
other witnesses describing the potential for the 10-acre 
building envelope, the Commission concludes that the 
65% for the buildable portion applies to the 10 buildable 
acres and is not appropriately limited to a one-acre home 
site. 
(R. 000064). 
This essential factual finding, which forms the sole basis of Wasatch 
County's cross-appeal, is supported by substantial evidence presented by Wasatch 
County's own witnesses. Rather than attempt to present such evidence, Wasatch 
County instead elects to ignore it completely and urges this Court to adopt Wasatch 
County's position, which was not even supported by Wasatch County's own 
witnesses at the hearing. 
For example, Glen Burgener, the Wasatch County Assessor, testified as 
follows: 
Mr. Burgener: In going over it, talking as a group about 
the effects of the conservation easement and development 
rights and the 10 acre area of disturbance, and the 
conclusion was that the value - the bulk of the value 
should be in the area that can be disturbed... 
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(R. 001371) 
Mr. Burgener did testify further that he would allocate the bulk of value to 
the one-acre home site, but could provide no justification for doing so. (R. 
001371-001373). 
Mr. Hales, another Wasatch County Witness, when questioned by the Tax 
Commission testified as follows: 
(Tax Commissioner Marc Johnson) Mr. Johnson: 
Okay great. Now did - as I listened to your testimony 
and - um - perused your appraisal, you looked at one 
acre and 159 acres. You didn't look at the 10 acre 
envelope. 
Mr, Hales: You know, if it would have been my choice, 
I probably would've gone with 10 acres and said one, but 
the county [Wasatch County] told me that their standard 
was one acre. And so— 
Mr. Johnson: Okay. 
Mr. Hales: I wanted to be consistent with what the 
assessor had been doing. 
Mr. Johnson: So - so if I understand that correctly, then 
if you had been asked - a change of an assignment - and 
I don't know how to find that, but you would - in doing 
an allocation, you would have allocated value to 10 
acres? 
Mr. Hales: Well, I probably would have chosen a little 
bit larger parcel. But it's so difficult because with the 
assessment, to know, if they put a barn on it to know -
you can't - ...the county's decision to go with one acre 
was fine with me. 
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Mr. Johnson: Not even making that assumption, would 
— would you have broken it down to one acre, 10 acre 
components or would you have valued outside of the 
greenbelt statute just the entire 160 acres. 
Mr. Hales: If someone had asked me to just break out 
the components, I probably would have just looked at it 
legally and not even worried about the physical aspect of 
it. You know, I would5ve said this is what the building 
right is worth... 
Mr. Johnson: ...don't let me force words into your 
mouth, but it appears to me you would not have 
appraised a one acre parcel of land, would that be 
correct? 
Mr. Hales: I think that's correct. I think neither one of 
us actually appraised a one acre parcel. Both parties 
were trying to come to what hopefully what would be a 
reasonable allocation for that component of property. 
Mr. Johnson: So you've allocated value to one acre of 
land? 
Mr. Hales: With the building rights included. 
Mr. Johnson: So this - these are my words - you are 
essentially allocating one of the sticks in the bundle of 
rights to an acre of land? 
Mr. Hales: Those would be my words too. 
(R. 001445-001450). 
Mr. Hales, Wasatch County's own witness, testified that in attempting to 
value the one-acre home site, he valued the building rights and the building rights 
increased the value of the one-acre home site. It is undisputed that the building 
rights attach to the entire ten-acre building envelope. There was no testimony or 
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other evidence explaining why the value of the building rights should be allocated 
to a single acre, when up to ten acres of land (the building envelope) are available 
for buildings and improvements. When questioned, Mr. Hales testified that, "You 
know, if it would have been my choice, I probably would've gone with 10 acres 
and said one, but the county [Wasatch County] told me that their standard was one 
acre. And so" Id. 
Curiously Wasatch County did not think any of tljis testimony provided any 
evidentiary support for the Tax Commission Decision, atid therefore failed to even 
to present it. The testimony of Wasatch County's dwn witnesses at the Tax 
Commission hearing repudiate Wasatch County's appellate brief before this Court. 
Clearly, it is undisputed that the building rights, Which formed the sole basis 
for disproportionately valuing the ten-acre building envelope, attached to all ten-
acres of the building envelope, not just the value of thfe one acre (or less) home 
site. Moreover, Wasatch County provided no evidence justifying the allocation of 
the value of such building rights to a single acre. The Tax Commission based its 
Decision solely on Wasatch County's Witnesses and evidence, which indeed 
provided substantial evidence in support of the Tax Commission's Decision. 
Wasatch County failed to marshal the evidence presented above, failed to 
demonstrate that the Tax Commission Decision was not supported by substantial 
evidence, but rather merely argues that this Court should reweigh the evidence in 
4831-3554-8419.7 27 
its favor even though there was no evidence presented to support its position that 
the entire value of the building rights attached to the one-acre (or less) home site. 
For these reasons Wasatch County's cross-appeal must be dismissed. 
V. WASATCH COUNTY FURTHER ARGUES THAT IT WAS 
SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED BY THE TAX COMMISSION 
DECISION, WHEN IN FACT IT IS THE PROPERTY OWNERS 
WHO WERE SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED. 
Wasatch County argues it was substantially prejudiced because the Tax 
Commission Decision "artificially reduces the value of the homes sites" thereby 
improperly shifting the property tax burden among the population. Wasatch 
County's argument is inappropriate and ignores reality. The effect of the Tax 
Commission Decision is to improperly shift value from the 159 acre part of a lot at 
Wolf Creek Ranch subject to the Farmland Assessment Act to the one-acre home 
site, which home site is not subject to the Act. The true effect of Wasatch 
County's improper shift is to artificially increase the property tax burden imposed 
on the Property Owners, and thereby violate the fundamental purpose of the 
Farmland Assessment Act. The Farmland Assessment Act is intended to slow 
development, and prevent the loss of farm land by imposing a property tax upon 
land subject to the Act in accordance with its agricultural use value, instead of the 
prevailing market value. By ignoring existing zoning laws, the Tax Commission 
Decision shifts the value of the Property Owners' parcels to land that is not subject 
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to the Farmland Assessment Act, thereby increasing the valuation of such portion 
of the parcels to 256 times its value. 
Wasatch County has not, nor could it legitimately, challenge the Property 
Owners' eligibility for assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act. Instead 
Wasatch County seeks to negate the revenue loss causecjl by the application of the 
Farmland Assessment Act by attempting to migrate nearly the entire value of the 
entire 160 acre parcel to the single acre home site not subjject to the Act. 
Wasatch County is politically free to oppose the Farmland Assessment Act. 
While Wasatch County may not support the Farmland Assessment Act because it 
reduces property tax revenues, the purpose of the Farmland Assessment Act cannot 
be violated by using valuation sophistries to shift the vast majority of the value of a 
single 160 acre parcel of land from land subject to the Farmland Assessment Act to 
land that has been withdrawn from agricultural use (not subject to Act). 
While it may be Wasatch County's subjective .belief that the Property 
Owners' are not paying sufficient taxes because their parcels are undervalued, 
Wasatch County's subjective belief is irrelevant to an appropriate adjudication of 
this Appeal. The Property Owners' parcels must be valiied, assessed and taxed in 
accordance with Utah law. If Wasatch County's subjective belief is that Utah law 
is unfair in this regard, the County is free to seek relief through legislative 
amendment, but must do so in the Utah Legislature, not before this Court. 
4831-3554-8419.7 29 
Indeed, if subjective belief were relevant, it is undisputed that the Property 
Owners each pay more than their fair share of property taxes, if such taxes are 
compared to the basic benefits each Property Owner receives from Wasatch 
County, A substantial and undisputed property tax is imposed upon the structures 
(home and improvements) and each acre of land which each Property Owner owns. 
Such property taxes amount to a windfall for Wasatch County as: (1) the 
Property Owners do not have children in Wasatch County schools; (2) the Property 
Owners generally do not receive any services from Wasatch County because all 
services are performed by their home owners' association at the sole expense of the 
Property Owners, including the original construction and paving of all roads, all 
repair and maintenance of the roads, all snow removal and keeping the roads open 
for travel, fire department services (home owner's association has 3 fire vehicles), 
weed control, full-time security; and (3) the majority of the Property Owners are 
present in the state for less than few weeks a year. They do not, therefore, use the 
local roads, benefit from mosquito abatement or Wasatch County facilities, each of 
which is paid for with property tax revenues. (R. 001463-001468) 
2
 Mr. Douglas Anderson, the "primary developer" at Wolf Creek Ranch testified at 
the Tax Commission hearing, "The homeowners association is repairing those 
[roads] currently [April 21, 2008]. And when they need to be replaced, resurfaced, 
or taken out and rebuilt, it will be the homeowners association that pays for all of 
that." Record at 001493. 
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Correct or not, tax policy is not within the province of the judiciary. 
Therefore if a change to the tax policy of the state is desired by one or more of the 
parties to this appeal, such change MUST be sought in the legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law, the Tax Commission's Decision must be reversed 
because it violates the statutorily and constitutionally mandated assessment of 
property at "fair market value," which requires that assessment of property be 
"determined using current zoning laws applicable to the property in question," 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12), and not in disregard of such laws. The Tax 
Commission Decision disregards the "fair market value" statute and the zoning 
laws applicable to the Wolf Creek Ranch parcels because it concentrates value on 
less than the entire acreage when the applicable zoning, laws preclude the sale or 
exchange of any part or subcomponent of the 160 acre platted lot. 
Hence, this Court should reverse the Tax Commission's Decision and 
require Wasatch County to value the Property Owners' parcels in the only legally 
permissible manner, which is to value the entire 160 I acre platted parcel at its 
highest and best use and multiply such value by the percentage such portion bears 
to the total acreage. 
The purpose of the Farmland Assessment Act is to slow development and 
farm loss by taxing land subject to the Farmland Assessment Act in accordance 
4831-3554-8419.7 31 
with its agricultural use value instead of the prevailing market value. The Tax 
Commission Decision frustrates this purpose by illegally shifting the value of the 
building rights to a one-acre part of the parcel even though legally a minimum of 
160 acres is required in order to have a single home site. In fact, according to the 
Tax Commission Decision, the one-acre home site has a value 256 times greater 
than the remaining acreage regardless of the fact that all 160 acres are legally 
required to have a building right at all. It is clear that Wasatch County does not 
support the Farmland Assessment Act, but it should not be allowed to do an end 
around the Farmland Assessment Act by arbitrarily increasing the value of the land 
withdrawn from the Farmland Assessment Act, all of which is contained within an 
indivisible platted parcel, to make up for the property taxes its perceives have been 
lost as a result of the taxation under the Farmland Assessment Act. If Wasatch 
County seeks to repeal the Farmland Assessment Act, it must seek to do so in the 
Utah Legislature, not this Court. 
DATED this 3 day of March, 2009. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2. [Property tax.] 
(1) So that each person and corporation pays a tax in proportion to the fair market 
value of his, her, or its tangible property, all tangible property in the State that is 
not exempt under the laws of the United States or under this Constitution shall be: 
(a) assessed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its fair market value, 
to be ascertained as provided by law; and 
(b) taxed at a uniform and equal rate. 
(2) Each corporation and person in the State or doing business in the State is 
subject to taxation on the tangible property owned or used by the corporation or 
person within the boundaries of the State or local authority levying the tax, 
(3) The Legislature may provide by statute that land used for agricultural purposes 
be assessed based on its value for agricultural use. 
(4) The Legislature may by statute determine the manner and extent of taxing 
livestock. 
(5) The Legislature may by statute determine the manner and extent of taxing or 
exempting intangible property, except that any property tax on intangible property 
may not exceed .005 of its fair market value. If any intangible property is taxed 
under the property tax, the income from that property may not also be taxed. 
(6) Tangible personal property required by law to be registered with the State 
before it is used on a public highway or waterway, on public land, or in the air may 
be exempted from property tax by statute. If the Legislature exempts tangible 
personal property from property tax under this Subsection (6), it shall provide for 
the payment of uniform statewide fees or uniform statewide rates of assessment or 
taxation on that property in lieu of the property tax. The fair market value of any 
property exempted under this Subsection (6) shall be considered part of the State 
tax base for determining the debt limitation under Article XIV. 
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59-2-503, Qualifications for agricultural use assessment 
(1) For general property tax purposes, land may be assessed on the basis of the 
value that the land has for agricultural use if the land: 
(a) is not less than five contiguous acres in area, except that land may be 
assessed on the basis of the value that the land has for agricultural use: 
(i) if: 
(A) the land is devoted to agricultural use in conjunction with 
other eligible acreage; and 
(B) the land and the other eligible acreage described in 
Subsection (l)(a)(i)(A) have identical legal ownership; or 
(ii) as provided under Subsection (4); and 
(b) except as provided in Subsection (5): 
(i) is actively devoted to agricultural use; and 
(ii) has been actively devoted to agricultural use for at least two 
successive years immediately preceding the tax year for which the land is 
being assessed under this part. 
(2) In determining whether land is actively devoted to agricultural use, production 
per acre for a given county or area and a given type of lan i^ shall be determined by 
using the first applicable of the following: 
(a) production levels reported in the current publication of the Utah 
Agricultural Statistics; 
and 
(b) current crop budgets developed and published by Utah State University; 
(c) other acceptable standards of agricultural production designated by the 
commission by rule adopted in accordance with Title 63 G^  Chapter 3, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(3) Land may be assessed on the basis of the land's agricultural value if the land 
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(a) is subject to the privilege tax imposed by Section 59-4-101; 
(b) is owned by the state or any of the state's political subdivisions; and 
(c) meets the requirements of Subsection (1). 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(a), the commission or a county board of 
equalization may grant a waiver of the acreage limitation for land upon: 
(a) appeal by the owner; and 
(b) submission of proof that: 
(i) 80% or more of the owner's, purchaser's, or lessee's income is 
derived from agricultural products produced on the property in question; or 
(ii) (A) the failure to meet the acreage requirement arose solely as a 
result of an acquisition by a governmental entity by: 
(I) eminent domain; or 
(II) the threat or imminence of an eminent domain proceeding; 
(B) the land is actively devoted to agricultural use; and 
(C) no change occurs in the ownership of the land. 
(5) (a) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(b), thexommission or a county board of 
equalization may grant a waiver of the requirement that the land is actively devoted 
to agricultural use for the tax year for which the land is being assessed under this 
part upon: 
(i) appeal by the owner; and 
(ii) submission of proof that: 
(A) the land was assessed on the basis of agricultural use for at 
least two years immediately preceding that tax year; and 
(B) the failure to meet the agricultural production requirements 
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for that tax year was due to no fault or act of the owner, purchaser, or 
lessee. 
(b) As used in Subsection (5)(a), "fault" does not include: 
(i) intentional planting of crops or trees which, because of the 
maturation period, do not give the owner, purchaser, or lessee a 
reasonable opportunity to satisfy the production levels required for 
land actively devoted to agricultural use; or 
(ii) implementation of a bona fide range improvement program, crop 
rotation program, or other similar accepted cultural practices which do 
not give the owner, purchaser, or lessee a reasonable opportunity to 
satisfy the production levels required for land actively devoted to 
agricultural use. 
59-2-506. Rollback tax — Penalty — Computation of tax — Procedure — Lien 
— Interest — Notice — Collection — Distribution — Appeal to county board of 
equalization. 
(1) Except as provided in this section, Section 59-2-506.5, or Section 59-2-511, if 
land is withdrawn from this part, the land is subject to a rollback tax imposed in 
accordance with this section. 
(2) (a) An owner shall notify the county assessor that land is withdrawn from this 
part within 120 days after the day on which the land is withdrawn from this part. 
(b) An owner that fails to notify the county assessor under Subsection (2)(a) 
that land is withdrawn from this part is subject to a penalty equal to the greater of: 
(i)$10;or 
(ii) 2% of the rollback tax due for the last year of the rollback period. 
(3) (a) The county assessor shall determine the amount of the rollback tax by 
computing the difference for the rollback period described in Subsection (3)(b) 
between: 
(i) the tax paid while the land was assessed under this part; and 
(ii) the tax that would have been paid had the property not been 
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assessed under this part. 
(b) For purposes of this section, the rollback period is a time period that: 
(i) begins on the later of: 
(A) the date the land is first assessed under this part; or 
(B) five years preceding the day on which the county assessor 
mails the notice required by Subsection (5); and 
(ii) ends the day on which the county assessor mails the notice 
required by Subsection (5). 
(4) (a) The county treasurer shall: 
(i) collect the rollback tax; and 
(ii) after the rollback tax is paid, certify to the county recorder that the 
rollback tax lien on the property has t>een satisfied by: 
(A) preparing a document that certifies that the rollback tax lien 
on the property has been satisfied; and 
(B) providing the document described in Subsection 
(4)(a)(ii)(A) to the county recorder for recordation. 
(b) The rollback tax collected under this section shall: 
(i) be paid into the county treasury; and 
(ii) be paid by the county treasurer to the various taxing entities pro 
rata in accordance with the property tax levies for the current year. 
(5) (a) The county assessor shall mail to an owner of the land that is subject to a 
rollback tax a notice that: 
(i) the land is withdrawn from this part; 
(ii) the land is subject to a rollback tax under this section; and 
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(iii) the rollback tax is delinquent if the owner of the land does not pay 
the tax within 30 days after the day on which the county assessor mails the 
notice. 
(b) (i) The rollback tax is due and payable on the day the county assessor 
mails the notice required by Subsection (5)(a). 
(ii) Subject to Subsection (7), the rollback tax is delinquent if an 
owner of the land that is withdrawn from this part does not pay the rollback 
tax within 30 days after the day on which the county assessor mails the 
notice required by Subsection (5)(a). 
(6) (a) Subject to Subsection (6)(b), the following are a lien on the land assessed 
under this part: 
(i) the rollback tax; and 
(ii) interest imposed in accordance with Subsection (7). 
(b) The lien described in Subsection (6)(a) shall: 
(i) arise upon the imposition of the rollback tax under this section; 
(ii) end on the day on which the rollback tax and interest imposed in 
accordance with Subsection (7) are paid in full; and i 
(iii) relate back to the first day of the rollback period described in 
Subsection (3)(b). 
(7) (a) A delinquent rollback tax under this section shall accrue interest: 
i 
(i) from the date of delinquency until paid; and 
(ii) at the interest rate established under Section 59-2-1331 and in 
effect on January 1 of the year in which the delinquency occurs. 
(b) A rollback tax that is delinquent on September 1 of any year shall be 
included on the notice required by Section 59-2-1317, along with interest 
calculated on that delinquent amount through November 30 of the year in 
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which the notice under Section 59-2-1317 is mailed. 
(8) (a) Land that becomes ineligible for assessment under this part only as a result 
of an amendment to this part is not subject to the rollback tax if the owner of the 
land notifies the county assessor that the land is withdrawn from this part in 
accordance with Subsection (2). 
(b) Land described in Subsection (8)(a) that is withdrawn from this part as a 
result of an event other than an amendment to this part, whether voluntary or 
involuntary, is subject to the rollback tax. 
(9) Except as provided in Section 59-2-511, land that becomes exempt from 
taxation under Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 3, is not subject to the 
rollback tax if the land meets the requirements of Section 59-2-503 to be assessed 
under this part. 
(10) (a) Subject to Subsection (10)(b), an owner of land may appeal to the county 
board of equalization: 
(i) a decision by a county assessor to withdraw land from assessment 
under this part; or 
(ii) the imposition of a rollback tax under this section. 
(b) An owner shall file an appeal under Subsection (10)(a) no later than 45 
days after the day on which the county assessor mails the notice required by 
Subsection (5). 
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